The case of Coastal Gujarat is also an appropriate case for a revision under Article 137 of the Indian Constitution, as it appears that there is at least one obvious factual error. The Supreme Court, in paragraph 32 of the judgment, states that “the borrower entered into separate loan agreements with 13 financial institutions.” In fact, there were only five different loan contracts, not thirteen. The borrower has sufficient reason to proceed with a review of the Supreme Court decision because of this error, which is evident in the Supreme Court decision. Under Supreme Court rules, 2013 (in accordance with section 145 – the rule power of the SC) should file a motion for review within 30 days of sentencing and, where possible, it must be presented to the same bank that delivered the verdict. Moreover, in the context of the examination of stamps in other states, there does not appear to be any other state that has amended the corresponding provision of its stamp duty law to introduce “different transactions” into its scope. We believe (assuming that the Supreme Court correctly interprets the intent to legislate behind the amendment to Section 5 of the Gujarat Stamp Act, 1958), under the Supreme Court decision, all bonds (whether through loans to the consortium or separate loan contracts) that have only one mortgage instrument of a property in Gujarat to insure loans from several banks to a debt custodian for all lenders would be treated as separate transactions and would be responsible for paying stamp tax in Gujarat, as if each separate mortgage contract would be accounted for. The Supreme Court decision has, on its face, serious repercussions on the bank. Given the context of this particular transaction (and other similarly placed transactions), such an opinion of the Supreme Court would further increase the cost of credit and would also weigh on creditworthy Indian industry/companies. However, if we look carefully at the judgment, it is clear that the Supreme Court decision is a) factual and (b) the stamp duty of the state. The judgment report is mainly due to the fact that the aum part of Section 5 of the Gujarat Stamp Act, In 1958, it was extended to “different transactions,” which essentially means that this judgment would only involve (mortgage) transactions in i) Gujarat and other similar states that amended Section 5 to engage in “different transactions” under their national legislation, and (ii) when the loan was used by several loan agreements, contrary to a common syndicated credit contract. Is there a foreign exchange control that limits payments to a foreign lender as part of a security document, guarantee or loan agreement? We believe that the case of coastal Gujarat should, at best, be treated as an exception.
This case may not be the norm because different credit documents have been executed with a single mortgage deed. In most cases of syndicated credit, there is a single agreement on which the Indian Bankers` Association draft was published, and in these cases the Supreme Court decision is not applicable, as there is no similar provision of the law that requires a “different transaction” in countries other than Gujarat.